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THE
FIELDS INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES
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PUBLIC
LECTURE SERIES
September
11, 2014 at 5:00 p.m
Fields Institute, Room 230
ROBERT ALIBER
University of Chicago
The Source of Financial Crisis
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ABSTRACT
There have been four waves of banking crisis in the last
thirty years, each has involved three, four, or more countries;
each country has experienced a sharp decline in prices of
securities and most have had dramatic falls in the price
of their currency. The first wave was in 1982 and involved
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and ten other developing countries.
Japan and two of the Nordic countries--Finland and Sweden--were
engulfed in the second wave in the early 1990s; the banking
crisis in Norway was several years earlier. The Asian Financial
Crisis that began in July 1997 was the third wave; Mexico
had a crisis at the end of 1994. The fourth wave occurred
in September 2008 and involved the United States, Britain,
Iceland, Ireland, Spain, and then Greece and Portugal.
One of the unique features of the last thirty years is the
strong overlap between banking crises and currency crises.
Ninety percent of banking crises have occurred together
with a currency crises, the borrowers have defaulted on
foreign loans and the price of the countries' currency has
declined, often sharply. And every currency crisis has occurred
with a banking crisis.
My stylized model for this pairing is as follows. Every
country that has experienced a banking crisis had previously
experienced an economic boom. Moreover nearly every country
that has experienced a boom before its crisis had experienced
an increase in cross border investment inflows. When a country's
currency is floating, changes in its current account balance
must be continuously equal with different signs. The invisible
hands are at work, the increase in the price of the country's
currency and the increase in household wealth together explain
the increase in the country's current account deficit. If
the induced increase in the country's current deficit appears
to be smaller than the autonomous increase in its capital
account surplus, the market in the country's currency will
not clear; the price of its currency or the price of securities
or both prices will continue to increase until the market
clears.
Moreover, every banking crisis that I have studied has occurred
when the lenders became increasingly cautious about extending
more credit to the borrowers. A banking crisis occurs when
the flow of credit to a group of borrowers declines, and
a currency crisis occurs when the flow of credit is from
foreign lenders. The decline in the price of the currency
as the currency crisis develops intensifies the banking
crisis because the domestic currency counterpart of liabilities
denominated in a foreign currency increase.
The data on the changes in the prices of currencies and
the impact of cross border investment flows on national
economies challenge the claims made by proponents of floating
currencies in the 1950s and 1960s. They said changes in
the prices of currencies would be gradual, some currencies
have fallen off steep cliffs. They said the deviations between
the market prices of currencies and the long run equilibrium
prices would be smaller if currencies were allowed to float
because the market prices of currencies would track the
differences in inflation rates, instead these deviations
have been many times larger. They claimed that there would
be fewer currency crises; instead there have been many more
currency crisis and they have been much more severe and
have intensified banking crisis. They said that the uncertainty
about the prices of currencies would insulate each country
from shocks in other countries; instead the sharp variability
in cross-border currency flows has led to the boom and bust
cycle. They also claimed that uncertainty about the prices
of currencies would not deter trade and investment (which
obviously was inconsistent with their claim that uncertainty
would insulate countries from shocks in other countries)
but they never asked about the cost of hedging the uncertainty
and who would bear these costs.
The monetary constitution for the gold standard was the
"rules of the game", a descriptive model that
summarized the how transfers of gold among countries would
lead to a new equilibrium after a shock had led to payments
imbalances. The Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund was a monetary constitution, and proscribed
certain changes in the prices of currencies. The current
international monetary international monetary arrangement
is dysfunctional because the sharp variability in cross
border currency flows leads to boom and bust cycles.
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About Robert Aliber
Robert Z. Aliber is a Professor Emeritus of International
Economics and Finance at the University of Chicago. He is
best known for his contribution to the theory of foreign direct
investment. Aliber received a Bachelor of Arts degree from
Williams College (1952) and Bachelor of Arts (1954) and a
Master of Arts (1957) from Cambridge University. He received
his Ph. D. from Yale University. He was appointed as an Associate
Professor at the University of Chicago in 1964.
Aliber brought out the fifth and sixth editions and is preparing
the seventh edition of Charles Kindlebergers 1978 classic
Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises.
Aliber predicted the Icelandic banking crisis months eighteen
months before it happened.
In this talk, Aliber offers a unique and very different view
on the cause of financial crises, discusses why banking crises
are almost always occur together with currency crises, and
why cross border investment flows should be moderated.
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